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The Syrian Humanitarian Disaster: 
Disparities in Perceptions, 
Aspirations, and Behaviour in 
Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey
Dawn Chatty 
Abstract Humanitarian assistance coupled with an unsustainable policy 
of regional containment have only created greater poverty and misery 
for Syrians fleeing civil war. How this has been allowed to happen on 
the southern shores of the Mediterranean – where extraordinary social 
linkages and networks have existed for centuries – lies mainly in the 
disparities between perceptions, aspirations and behaviour among refugees, 
practitioners and policymakers in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. This article 
highlights in particular three such disconnects: the ahistorical approach 
to engaging with displaced people in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, which 
has led to the implementation of international blueprints of humanitarian 
support that are disconnected from people’s needs; the imposition of an 
encampment policy at odds with displaced people’s need for temporary 
settlement enabled through their own social networks; the redundancy of 
humanitarian practitioners’ background and experience in dealing with the 
particularities of displaced populations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
the failure to build on practices that work.
1 From a refuge state to a Syrian mass exodus
In the 100 years between 1850 and 1950 Syria received several million 
forced migrants from the contested borderlands between the Imperial 
Russian and Ottoman Empires. Following three Ottoman-Russian wars 
between the 1850s and 1880s, more than 3 million forced migrants from 
Crimea, the Caucasus and the Balkans entered the Ottoman provinces of  
Anatolia; many continued on their journeys to the Arab regions of  Greater 
Syria. The Ottoman administration established a special commission 
to address the needs of  these forcibly displaced Tatars, Circassians, 
Chechnyans, Abkhaza, Abaza, and other related ethnic groups. 
This ‘Refugee Commission’ – the first of  its kind in contemporary 
Western history – offered incoming forced migrants agricultural land, 
draught animals, seeds, and other support in the form of  tax relief  for 
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a decade, and exemptions from military service (Chatty 2010). Every 
effort was made to help these settlers become self-sufficient in as short 
a time as possible. The administration encouraged integration into 
numerous ethnically mixed settlements of  Greater Syria to promote 
and preserve the cosmopolitan and convivial nature of  urban and rural 
communities in the late Ottoman Empire. By the end of  the nineteenth 
century, Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid II and his subjects came to 
regard providing refuge as not only a social and compassionate gesture, 
but also a religious and moral duty (Chatty 2013).
Then, as the First World War drew to a close, as many as half  a million 
Armenian Christians found refuge in Syria, settling among their 
co-religionists in Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut. When the modern 
Republic of  Turkey was established in 1923, 10,000 Kurds from Turkey 
fled across the border into Syria, choosing to escape from the forced 
secularism of  Kemal Atatürk’s new Turkey. The inter-war French 
mandate over Syria saw a continuation of  these processes, with waves of  
Assyrian Christians entering the country in the 1930s, seeking asylum 
and safety from conditions in Iraq when Great Britain returned its 
mandate to the League of  Nations,1 having failed to secure peace and 
security in the country on its own terms. 
All these forced migrants were granted citizenship in the new Syrian 
state. And then in the late 1940s, Syria became a safe haven for over 
100,000 Palestinians fleeing the Nakba, which was concurrent with the 
creation of  the state of  Israel. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that 
the population of  the modern Syrian state provided refuge for hundreds 
of  thousands, if  not millions, of  ethno-religious minorities uprooted 
from their homelands. Consequently, strong social and economic ties 
were maintained broadly within the region and throughout the Balkans, 
Eastern Europe and borderlands with Russia.
A decade into the twenty-first century, Syria has disintegrated into 
extreme violence, which has triggered a displacement crisis of  massive 
proportions. The speed at which Syria has been emptied of  nearly 
20 per cent of  its population has shocked the world and left the 
humanitarian aid regime in turmoil as agencies struggle to respond to 
the growing displacement crisis on its borders. 
Each state bordering Syria has responded differently to this complex 
emergency: Turkey rushed to set up its own refugee camps for the most 
vulnerable groups, but generally supported people finding their own way 
and ‘self-settling’ in rural areas and urban centres; Lebanon refused to 
allow international humanitarian aid agencies to set up formal refugee 
camps, assuming that the Syrians would self-settle among ‘kith and kin’ or 
use social and economic contacts to find refuge; and Jordan prevaricated 
for nearly a year, before insisting on the establishment of  a massive United 
Nations (UN) refugee camp in the desert borderland between the two 
countries. To be fair, all the states neighbouring Syria assumed this would 
be a short crisis, with the Syrians’ return likely in months rather than years.
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Turkey and Lebanon initially permitted Syrians to enter as temporary 
‘guests’. Lebanon closed this door in 2015, while Turkey has continued 
to allow Syrians to enter the country. Jordan hoped to contain the flow 
of  people seeking refuge far from any urban centre and has insisted 
that all Syrians that the security services intercept crossing the border 
must go to the UN refugee border camp at Za’tari. Failing in that it 
has returned some categories of  people fleeing from Syria (specifically, 
Palestinian refugees from Syria), contrary to international legal 
principles of  non-refoulement.2 
Lebanon and Jordan have not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention that 
sets out principles and responsibilities of  states in providing protection 
and asylum for those deemed to fit the definition of  ‘refugee’ according 
to the 1951 Statutes and the 1967 Protocol. And although Turkey has 
signed the 1951 Convention, it has reserved its interpretation of  it to 
apply only to Europeans who are seeking refuge or asylum in Turkey. 
Hence, refuge in the region is not ‘rights based’, but rather is at the 
mercy of  local cultural notions (institutions) of  hospitality and duties of  
generosity. These customs are known – over time – to also raise parallel 
notions of  hostility and parsimony. Hospitality at either individual or 
state level is never open-ended. 
According to UN estimates, over 70 per cent of  Syrian refugees who 
cross international borders self-settle in cities, towns and villages where 
they have long-established social networks. Many refuse to register as 
refugees and so are ‘invisible’ to aid agencies. This population is not 
served by the international humanitarian aid regime, which is focused 
almost entirely on the camps the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) set 
up in Jordan, and on the larger informal settlements in Lebanon; in 
particular, the Bekaa Valley where the majority of  Syrians previously 
worked as seasonal agricultural labourers. 
The UN does not run any refugee camps in Turkey, although it provides 
some support through partner agencies such as UNICEF and the World 
Food Programme. This is in part political. Previous crises in the region 
have been managed through government structures and without setting 
up refugee camps. For example, with the Iraqi crisis in Syria, the Syrian 
government insisted that all international aid came through government 
channels – and not through the few non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) permitted to operate in the country – and was used for Syrians 
and Iraqis alike. Given that Iraqis refused to go into refugee camps – and 
the Syrian regime did not want to set any up – UNHCR was forced to 
deal with self-settled refugees and members of  their hosting communities 
on an equal basis, which it did well. However, subsequently that has not 
been the case with Jordan, which insisted on setting up camps for Syrians 
– and handing over their administration to UNHCR – fearing that 
otherwise Syrians would self-settle around the country. 
In Turkey, most refugees are clustered in the southern region of  the 
country, including the Hatay, which borders Syria. Some 25–30 per cent 
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of  the Syrian refugee flow into Turkey is directed into camps. The general 
management of  these Turkish government camps is such that a waiting list 
exists for refugees who wish to avail themselves of  the five-star service that 
is reputed to be on offer. In Lebanon, informal settlements – often based on 
pre-existing relationships and ‘gang master’ (shawish) agricultural hierarchies 
– are proliferating, with accompanying patron–client relationships 
overshadowing more participatory and transparent management of  
humanitarian aid. In Jordan, self-settled refugees from Syria are increasingly 
looking for work as they exhaust their savings. Those that the Jordanian 
security services find to be working illegally are deported to Syria or sent to 
the UN-managed refugee camps at Za’tari or Azraq, from which there is no 
escape other than paying to be ‘sponsored’ by a Jordanian, or smuggled out, 
re-entering the liminal state of  irregular status.
2 Mass influx, regionally contained?
Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan have each established a variety of  
temporary measures to deal with the crisis. However, in no case have 
displaced people or host communities been consulted. Discrepancies are 
rapidly becoming visible and tensions and protests have emerged among 
host communities, displaced Syrians and humanitarian policymakers. 
Humanitarian assistance templates created in other regions of  the 
world during waves of  crises in the six decades that UNHCR has been 
operating have not been well received in the region. 
Figure 1 Syrian refugee density and camps in neighbouring host countries
Source Redrawn from http://data.unhcr.org.
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Angry demonstrations in Jordan against rules and operating practices 
in Za’tari camp in 2012 led staff to restrict tent distribution until it was 
dark, to disperse extended families widely around the massive camp and 
hence reduce the level of  protest. In fact, UN camps have been rejected 
outright by the majority of  the Syrians fleeing the armed conflict, as 
well as by several neighbouring states. 
As time passes and savings are used up, many of  these Syrians face 
impoverishment. Their added immobility and lack of  local alternatives 
are rapidly creating an unsustainable situation that threatens to test the 
West’s preferred ‘solution’ of  regionally containing the crisis. Without 
significant changes in policy and practice throughout the region, larger 
numbers of  Syria’s forced migrants will shortly leave the region in search 
of  protection – albeit temporary – elsewhere. Unable to work or provide 
their children with an education, they will risk their lives in dangerous 
sea crossings and exhausting land marches led by people smugglers.
3 Research questions
This study sets out to understand the disparity in perceptions, 
aspirations, and behaviour of  refugees from Syria, members of  host 
communities, and practitioners in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. It also 
seeks to identify what measures, if  any, are regarded as important by 
the three target communities for return and reintegration in Syria when 
conditions permit.
3.1 Methodology and methods
The study is based on a multi-site, 12-month qualitative and participatory 
study, which was conducted between October 2014 and September 2015 in 
Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Interviews were conducted in Arabic and in 
English, and interpretation was only required in Turkey when interviewing 
members of  local communities that were hosting refugees from Syria. 
After selecting initial key informants using a purposive sampling approach, 
a snowballing technique was used to identify further participants for 
interview,3 paying attention to representativeness in terms of  gender, class, 
education, ethnicity and origin. A qualitative and interpretive approach, 
alongside a participant observation strategy, also defined this study. 
The study initiated a consultative engagement between practitioners, 
representatives of  hosting communities and the refugees themselves. It 
began with in-country recruitment of  researchers in collaboration with 
the facilitating research institutions: the Swedish Institute of  Istanbul 
in Turkey, American University of  Beirut in Lebanon, and Council for 
British Research in the Levant in Jordan. Fieldwork was divided into 
three phases in each country, each phase one month long: October 
2014 in Istanbul, Ankara and Gaziantep, Turkey; December 2014 in 
Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon; and February 2015 in Amman 
and Irbid, Jordan. Each field trip included exploratory informal and 
focused discussions, as well as semi-structured interviews with national 
and international practitioners, self-settled refugees and host community 
members, as well as refugees in camps.
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4 A precarious containment policy and its implications 
4.1 Lebanon
Many Syrians in Lebanon who have been displaced by the conflict in 
Syria do not feel that they are refugees. However, they sense a growing 
level of  social discrimination, especially in Beirut. In addition, they 
expressed their fear that the Lebanese associate them with a rise in 
criminality. Many of  the Syrians in Lebanon were not new to the 
country, but had been working there for many years in the construction 
and agriculture sectors. The conflict in Syria means that many of  these 
workers’ wives and children have fled Syria to join men who have 
been working in Lebanon for some time. They have largely made their 
journeys in stages, first arriving in Akkar or the Wadi Khalid region in 
north Lebanon and gradually making their way to join their spouses in 
the Bekaa Valley, Tripoli and Beirut. Syrian workers fear losing their 
jobs once it becomes known that their families have joined them, and 
this contributes to the fear, distress, and isolation many experience.
My husband came to Lebanon a long time ago, even before the war 
in Syria. He has been coming over since he was 17, therefore he 
knows Lebanon very well. He used come and go, stay for a while 
[working as a carpenter] and then go back to Syria. In 2011 he was 
in Lebanon; then the situation was very bad in Syria, so I came to 
Lebanon… my husband had a job and we stayed at his boss’s house. 
Back then I couldn’t go back to Hama. My husband had no intention 
of  bringing me to Lebanon, for him it was settled that he worked in 
Lebanon and I stayed in Syria. But after all the explosions in Hama, 
I couldn’t protect my kids. I decided to come and stay in Lebanon. 
My husband is always afraid he might be fired [if  the children get 
into any trouble] (Reem, Beirut, 2014). 
Arbitrary curfews – illegal under national and international law – in 
over 40 municipalities have meant that many Syrians are afraid to 
go out at night, work overtime or mix in any way with the Lebanese 
population. For many skilled and unskilled Syrians in Lebanon, the 
curfews have meant that older children and adolescents are taken out of  
school to work during daylight hours with their fathers.
My son should be in ninth grade, but he works in a supermarket now. 
But people tell me that it is a waste that my son is not in school. He 
will have no future without education. But our situation is very bad, 
I really want to send him to school, but at the same time we are in 
deep need and of  his financial help (Layla, Beirut, 2014). 
In the Bekaa Valley, Syrians who have no savings work for very low wages 
to provide their families with food. This has created hostility among local 
Lebanese who see Syrian workers as a threat to their own livelihoods, 
which has resulted in increased social discrimination and vigilantism. 
Many Syrians, despite their long association with Lebanon over decades 
and often close kinship ties, feel frightened and cut off from Lebanese 
(Endnotes)
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society. Although a number of  international and national and local 
NGOs operate in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley to provide basic needs, 
there is little interaction with Lebanese host communities. Very little 
evidence emerged from the interviews of  host community involvement 
in any ‘survival in dignity’4 activity on an individual basis; NGO activity 
was limited to more ‘distant and distancing’ charity work or local 
civil-society efforts in Beirut that middle-class Lebanese and Syrians 
resident in the country organised. 
UNHCR’s very slow response in providing cash assistance to the most 
needy and vulnerable Syrians in Lebanon has led to large numbers 
of  women and children begging in Beirut, something that Lebanese 
generally scorn and regard with little sympathy. UNHCR has expressed 
concern over the rise in begging and has identified it as a ‘negative 
coping strategy’, but UN agencies have made little effort to understand 
how this could be altered through changes in humanitarian policy 
and practice. Many refugees have exhausted their savings and have no 
opportunities to work. Thus, street begging, which is preferred to asking 
for charity, becomes the only way for people to feed their families. 
The consociational5 shape of  government in Lebanon, and the long 
period during the crisis when there was in effect ‘no government’, led to 
a period of  paralysis in the UN humanitarian aid system. Thus, effective 
relief  programmes for the poorest and most vulnerable Syrians – such 
as cash transfers – were very late in getting started, which resulted in 
an exponential rise in begging and other negative coping strategies 
(for example taking young children out of  school to work, moving into 
buildings unfit for human habitation, and relying on former agricultural 
gang masters to be the interface between the UN humanitarian relief  
system and refugees themselves). 
All these factors, with the close ties and often extended family networks 
among the very poor across the two countries, have led to significant 
social discrimination and an unwillingness or inability – at local level 
– to help Syrians with basic health and education needs. The lack 
of  education opportunities for nearly 50 per cent of  Syrian refugee 
children in Lebanon weighs heavily on their families. Some may 
pick a young family member to be smuggled out of  the region where 
employment or education may be possible.
4.2 Jordan
Most Syrians regard Jordan’s initial response to the humanitarian crisis 
and mass influx of  people from the Der’aa region of  Syria into the 
country as open and generous. Most of  these Syrians had kinship ties 
in northern Jordan or well-established social networks, and the hosting 
of  this initial influx was regarded as hospitable. However, over time the 
Jordanian government has restricted access to the country and actively 
prevented some from entering (e.g. young single men) and returned 
others (e.g. Palestinian refugees from Syria). 
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At the beginning you had a refugee crisis with a security component 
and it has become a security crisis with a refugee component. So 
in the early days it was ‘these are our brothers’ and so the natural 
generosity has now give way to more suspicion about who these 
people are and the security cared is played all the time now (Senior 
international practitioner, Amman, 2015). 
A discrepancy has emerged between what local media widely report 
– that Syrians are a burden on the Jordanian economy – and what 
policymakers and practitioners feel is actually occurring. The host 
community in Jordan is bombarded with information about the 
negative influence of  Syrian refugees in the country, but studies are 
emerging that do not back this up. Many policymakers believe that 
Syrians contribute far more to the Jordanian economy than is reported 
or spoken of  in society. Some point to an International Labour 
Organization report6 that suggested that unemployment of  Jordanians 
had not risen since the start of  the Syrian crisis, but actually dropped 
somewhat following the opening of  200 Syrian-owned factories, which 
employed an estimated 6,000 Jordanians.
Syrian refugees are skilled craftsmen, especially carpenters, we all 
know that. Jordanians are not skilled carpenters. Syrians are not 
taking jobs from Jordanians; but they may be taking jobs from 
Egyptians. They are working informally, but that puts a lot of  stress 
on them because they can be arrested and deported if  they are found 
out (Senior Jordanian policymaker, Amman 2015). 
Some social discrimination is aimed at Syrians in Jordan, but it is 
muted compared with that in Lebanon. Jordanians are quieter about 
negative social attitudes they may hold. This may be associated with 
tribal custom and general conceptual concerns related to the social 
requirement to show hospitality to strangers. 
However, Jordanian sensitivity to the presence of  Palestinian refugees 
from Syria has led to draconian surveillance to identify such refugees, a 
dragnet that often pulls in non-Palestinian refugees from Syria. Those 
found to be working illegally are either deported across the border – if  
Palestinian refugees from Syria – or sent to the Azraq or Za’tari camps, 
which creates greater mistrust and suspicion of  the host government 
among refugees.
Jordanians generally recognise that their country benefits from international 
aid from for refugees and that a significant percentage goes into direct 
government projects to assist Jordanians; for example, between 2016–19 
a joint US-Jordanian project will spend US$1bn on infrastructure 
development and the construction of  50 high schools for Jordanians. But 
despite the growing recognition of  the contribution refugees in Jordan make 
to the economy, this is not being translated into policy changes. 
Many Syrians feel pushed into either working illegally and facing 
deportation if  caught, or making the decision to leave Jordan. 
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Education opportunities for refugees are limited, and many Syrian 
children can only attend second-shift schools with inferior curricula 
and reduced hours. Some Syrians consider the situation in Jordan so 
dire that they are preparing to return to Syria rather than live in what 
they consider ‘inhuman conditions’ any longer. According to Andrew 
Harper, a senior UNHCR humanitarian aid practitioner in Jordan, by 
September 2015 at some points nearly 200 Syrians a day were returning 
to Syria (Naylor and Luck 2015). Many travel through Syria to Turkey 
in the hope of  finding a way to Europe where they might be able to 
work, send remittances to their families and educate their children. 
4.3 Turkey
Syrians in Turkey come from a variety of  backgrounds and social 
classes. Many Syrians are concerned with the negative images of  
‘dirty’ and ‘uncouth’ Arabs that middle-class Turks commonly express. 
Furthermore, Syrians have remarked that many Turkish observers have 
difficulty differentiating between the general Syrian refugee population 
and the nawaar (Gypsies).7 The Syrian crisis has displaced Gypsy 
communities in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, and they are commonly seen 
begging on the streets of  Istanbul and elsewhere. Largely unrecognised, 
the armed conflicts in Iraq and Syria have disrupted the peripatetic 
and seasonal economy of  the Gypsies of  south-west Asia, who have 
gravitated to Turkey for its greater security.
Recognition of  the needs of  Syrian refugees was widespread among 
members of  host Turkish communities. But they and Syrian refugees 
themselves widely condemned begging. In the words of  one interviewee: 
‘I don’t like to give money to beggars because it just encourages them’ 
(Turkish practitioner, Istanbul, 2014). 
Lack of  communication and poor understanding of  the situation of  
Syrians led to demonstrations, arrests and the deaths of  around a dozen 
Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees in October 2014. Many Turkish 
citizens felt that greater transparency on the part of  the government over 
what Syrians were entitled to would have relieved a critical situation and 
the growing discrimination. Many thought that the government was giving 
Syrian refugees salaries; others felt that Syrians worked for lower wages – 
their Turkish employers did not have to pay taxes because the Syrians were 
not ‘on the books’ – and this was driving out unskilled Turkish workers, 
who had no safety net when they lost their jobs to Syrians.
Widespread support in the third sector was especially noticeable among 
established NGOs, and Sufi-based civil-society organisations, rather 
than religious ones, which mainly provided hot meals and community-
supported accommodation. In Istanbul as well as Gaziantep, it was 
common for neighbourhood public kitchens to provide free meals and 
bread to the poor, as well as refugees living in the area.
My husband came first and then I joined him eight months later with 
our baby. At first we went to Mersin, but my husband couldn’t find 
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a job. When we ran out of  money we came to Gaziantep, because 
the Syrian Interim Government was here. We figured there would 
be more jobs here. So we came here and two months later we met 
this nice man who found a job for my husband and rented us these 
two rooms. Our neighbours gave us some mattresses and a TV 
to watch Syrian television. There is also a mosque nearby where 
I go and the people there give me diapers [nappies] for the baby, 
bread and daily hot meals, as well as supplies of  sugar, pasta and oil 
(Hala, Gaziantep, 2014). 
Lack of  a common language may have divided people at other 
times, but in the present crisis language seems to be less significant. 
For unskilled work, which is largely what Syrians are engaging in, 
language is not a barrier. Professionals and skilled workers, however, 
have found that it is not language but accreditation that is a barrier 
to working. Many have been unable to practise their professions, in 
particular doctors and health-care specialists until they have proved 
that they qualified outside Syria. But in other cases, being very different 
seems to have bred greater sympathy and general support at the local 
community level. 
In Turkey, lessons learned have been more widely implemented in 
response to critical events, such as the October 2014 demonstrations 
and criticism of  the government’s lack of  transparency. According to an 
International Crisis Group report in April 2013, international experts 
had described the camps that Turkish emergency relief  organisation 
IFAD has set up since in 2012 – without the assistance of  UN experts 
or their camp templates – as ‘five-star’.8 These settlements are open and 
refugees may enter and leave on a daily basis. Absences of  more than 
three weeks at a time are not tolerated, however, because of  the long 
waiting list of  Syrian refugees. 
Interviews in Turkey took place before the government in January 
2015 announced a law to issue Syrians with formal identity cards and 
provide temporary protection, including rights to health and education 
opportunities and permission to apply for work permits. But it was 
clear that Turkey was far more humane and practical in its approach to 
the mass influx of  Syrian refugees than Jordan or Lebanon, and social 
discrimination was at its lowest; and this despite a language barrier that 
does not exist in Lebanon or Jordan. 
Members of  Sufi-based organisations said that it was a religious and 
ethical duty to provide refuge for Syrians in their country. Much of  their 
activity has permitted a form of  local accommodation in Turkey, which 
has not happened in Lebanon or Jordan, despite the closer linguistic 
and social ties. Social cohesion has been strong, which bodes well in 
the event of  the local integration of  Syrians in Turkey, or as a friendly 
and supportive neighbouring state if  refugees ultimately return home, 
depending on the political solution that finally emerges. 
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5 Disconnects, redundant development models and ripple effects
The disparity in perceptions among refugees, members of  local hosting 
communities and practitioners is especially pronounced in Lebanon 
and Jordan, where the international humanitarian aid regime is the 
most active.
5.1 Humanitarian practitioners and the Syrian refugee population profile
Many young international staff have no experience of  the region, some 
coming, for example, from a single previous assignment in Africa. 
The cosmopolitan nature and generally high levels of  education and 
skills of  many of  the Syrians they encounter come as a surprise. The 
engagement of  UN humanitarian frameworks – an architecture of  
assistance – is built on templates developed over the past four decades, 
largely among agrarian and poor developing countries. Thus the 
populations these young international practitioners are used to dealing 
with tend to be largely uneducated and unskilled. Treating them as 
powerless victims of  a catastrophe and setting out the rules for receiving 
assistance generally goes unchallenged. 
Such policy and practice does not fit easily into the countries of  the 
Eastern Mediterranean among a refugee population that is largely 
educated and middle class, and people determined to maintain their 
agency, who prefer, for example, to receive cash assistance, rather than 
food aid. The disbelief  with which young international aid workers 
respond on learning that Syrian refugees are selling their food parcels, 
and the aid workers’ perception of  ‘ingratitude’, can only be explained 
in terms of  this cultural misunderstanding. They expect refugees to be 
passive recipients of  aid, and when they are not the aid workers respond 
negatively towards their efforts to do what they know is best for their 
families. Without a serious effort to make humanitarian ‘solutions’ fit the 
Middle Eastern context, success will continue to be muted at best and 
damaging at worst.
5.2 Temporary protection, not resettlement
It has become clear to most humanitarian aid workers that that self-
settlement is emerging as preferable to encampment. Encampment was 
seen as creating conditions for local accommodation, and potentially a 
return and re-integration into Syria’s many social communities. Lessons 
learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992–95 war support 
this position (Blitz 2015), when large numbers of  Bosnians were offered 
protection in Europe, and were widely dispersed among local communities 
rather than being enclosed in refugee camps until the crisis was resolved. 
Self-settlement and dispersal throughout Europe on a temporary basis – 
until conditions for return were right – meant that more countries stepped 
forward to take this temporary population. The UK alone took over 
75,000 Bosnians in one year and dispersed them across its cities.
There is a need for local community drop-in centres in the region that 
offer opportunities for non-formal education and technical training. 
Practitioners and refugees regularly suggested skills development, 
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psycho-social support and language instruction as measures to help local 
accommodation and provide a lost generation of  young people with 
a future. Policymakers and humanitarian aid practitioners referred to 
lessons learned from the practice of  setting up drop-in centres in Syria for 
Iraqi refugees as exemplary (Chatty and Mansour 2012). Opportunities 
for education for young Syrian refugees have not been made widely 
available, despite numerous studies pointing to gaps, all of  which has left 
the UN slogan ‘No lost generation’ no more than that: just a slogan.
Temporary protection, not resettlement, is the main aspiration for 
those who have been forced to flee Syria: to be able to work and 
educate their young people until they can eventually return to Syria. 
The temporary protection afforded to nearly 1.2 million Bosnians in 
Europe in a time of  crisis is an example of  what the European states 
can do if  they have the will.
5.3 What are the alternatives? 
It is noteworthy that Turkey, which has not requested assistance from 
UNHCR, seems to have managed the process of  providing assistance 
without undermining refugee agency and dignity. Largely working 
alone, with local staff drawn from the civil service, as well as the Disaster 
and Emergency Management Authority of  the Prime Minister’s Office 
(AFAD) and the main quasi-official Turkish NGO IHH, Turkey has 
managed the Syrian refugee crisis with sensitivity and concern. 
The separate social and political and migration histories of  the 
populations in Turkey and the countries of  the Levant have obviously 
contributed to the disparities in perceptions, aspirations and behaviour 
among refugees, host community members and practitioners in each 
of  the three countries. If  humanitarian policy’s starting point was to 
appreciate which displaced populations have relocated to which parts of  
the Middle East since the 1850s, policymakers and practitioners would 
understand to some extent the nature of  population movements from 
Syria today, as different groups seek to move to where members of  their 
communities have relocated, and capitalise on these ties to survive. 
That the Turkish government has refused to allow the UNHCR to have a 
significant or major role in Turkey, which is not the case in Lebanon and 
Jordan, has also contributed to some of  the disparities noted in this study. 
Whereas Turkey maintained a locally developed response to emergencies 
through its own national management of  refugee camps for Syrians, 
Lebanon and Jordan could not and thus faced having to accept or reject the 
internationally developed humanitarian aid template UNHCR proposed. 
Global templates for humanitarian assistance, built on experiences in 
very different contexts and among populations of  significantly different 
make-up, are not easily integrated into Middle Eastern concepts of  
refuge, hospitality and charity. The close social ties and networks of  
Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan, but not in Turkey (with the exception 
of  the Hatay), have meant that the initial generosity of  relatives hosting 
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refugees in a wide social network has more rapidly given way to hostility 
and discrimination, unlike the situation in Turkey where fewer Syrians 
had social networks and hosts accepted them based on a religious and 
ethical sense of  duty to look after strangers. 
Although Syrians, historically, have accepted wave after wave of  forced 
migrants from the Balkans, the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia, they 
have no experience of  creating camps. Most of  the several million 
forced migrants who entered Syria between the late nineteenth and early 
twenty-first centuries were encouraged to self-settle and disperse themselves 
throughout the country, relying on social ties, faith-based charity – 
particularly from Christian and Sufi associations – and support, in the first 
instance. Encampment was rejected in favour of  small-scale, local assistance 
and refuge. This aversion to encampment was also fed by the profoundly 
disturbing example of  numerous Palestinian refugee camps, which the UN 
set up in their midst over the course of  more than six decades. 
6 Final reflections
Across the board, what emerges is that history matters and that 
humanitarian templates created in other parts of  the world cannot 
simply be laid down in this complex ethno-religious, middle-income 
region of  the world. 
Historically, Syria has been a haven for displaced people fleeing wars 
between the Imperial Russian and Ottoman Empires, for Armenian 
refugees following the First World War, then Kurds, Assyrian Christians and 
later Palestinians. It is ironic that Syria should now be experiencing a mass 
exodus of  its own population, seeking refuge beyond the country’s borders.
Many of  the differences in attitudes and perceptions described in 
this article can be linked to Syria’s historic social ties and political 
relations with Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. In addition, the disparity in 
perceptions among policymakers, practitioners and host communities 
is widespread, but not equally so in the three countries. Many refugees 
and practitioners described steps that the UN and other international 
organisations could take to improve conditions, halt a potential mass 
exodus from the region, and create conditions on the ground for future 
return and reintegration in Syria.
The present situation is unsustainable. Lebanon and Jordan, and even 
Turkey, cannot cope with such high numbers of  refugees – currently 
over 3 million – for much longer; international assistance is insufficient 
to provide refugees with survival in dignity; and local social networks, as 
well as local organisations, cannot afford to help feed and clothe larger 
numbers without support. For example, if  the UK were to take the same 
number of  refugees relative to it population as Lebanon, it would accept 
at least 20 million refugees from Syria (instead of  the 20,000 that the 
government proposes to take over the next four years). 
Without a dramatic change in international humanitarian aid policy and 
programming people will resort to mass flight from the region, by any 
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means necessary, to secure survival in dignity (the opportunity to work to 
feed and educate their families until they can return to Syria), which they 
cannot access in the region. The Russian bombing campaign against 
opposition forces and the Islamic State (IS), alongside the Syrian regime’s 
barrel-bombing of  civilians and IS gains in the countryside, are leading 
to greater outflows of  Syrians, many of  them going directly to Europe. 
The danger continues to be that as long as the discrepancies in 
perceptions and aspirations among refugees, humanitarian practitioners 
and policymakers in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are not addressed, 
more Syrians will risk their lives making irregular movements to Europe 
in search of  survival with dignity. 
Notes
1 The League of  Nations was founded in 1920 shortly after the First 
World War as an intergovernmental organisation committed to 
maintaining world peace.
2 The return of  alleged refugees to their states of  origin is commonly 
referred to as refoulement. International treaties explicitly prohibit 
this practice; for example, Article 33 of  the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees.
3 Interviewees’ names have been changed to preserve their anonymity.
4 UNHCR uses the phrase ‘survival in dignity’ to mean being able to 
access basic necessities such as food, shelter and education for children.
5 Consociationalism is a stable democratic system in deeply divided 
societies that is based on power-sharing between elites from different 
social groups. In Lebanon it occurs between numerous ethno-
religious communities.
6 See www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_242021/lang--en/
index.htm
7 Also referred to as Romani, Rom and Dom.
8 See www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/
turkey/225-blurring-the-borders-syrian-spillover-risks-for-turkey.pdf
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